Immanuel Kant and David Hume are renowned psychology philosophers. Hume has a materialism-based perspective on all metaphysical deliberations, natural law, matter, soul, and God. He views all metaphysical deliberations, natural law, matter, soul, and God as mere outcomes, or products, of imagination (Pojman, 2002; Solomon, Higgins & Martin, 2016). He links all self-reference perceptions to external contingencies. He holds that every mind is subject to perception, meaning that the self is not detached from perception as well. On the other hand, Kant (1787) defines the self’s model that acknowledges math and physics and insulates faith and God concurrently. He employs physics principles in ascertaining what is characterized as the self according to Boeree (1999). This essay explores why Hume (1789) is convinced that the self is non-existent and Kant’s response to him.
Hume (1789) is convinced that the contents in a person’s mind stem from his or her experiences exclusively, with the trigger being internal or even external. In that nexus, he defines what he refers to as impressions, which he projects as different from ideas. According to him, an impression is a clear perception, is lively, and is strong. For him, the self and the mind are non-existent since any perception held by a person only becomes active when he or she is conscious. He comes off as reducing cognition, as well as personality, to a typical device that is put on or off accordingly according to Boeree (1999). Death brings to an end every perception that a person bears.
The inquiry method adopted by Hume (1789) commences with his supposition that experiences that are in themselves impressions are incapable of occasioning a self that is constant: a self that would constantly offer reference to every prospective experience. The notion, or idea, of self comprises of a number of impressions and ideas. One does not have the same impression for all the time he or she is conscious according to Boeree (1999). Diverse sensations, including cold, pleasure, heat, and pain are in an invariable, as opposed to constant, continuum according to Hume (1789). That means that the notion is derived from any impression. He concludes that from the foregoing, it is clear that such notion is non-existent
Additionally, Hume (1789) reflects on the place value, or position, of the identity of the existence that is uninterrupted as well as invariable. He establishes that there is no any primal, or primordial, material or substance pointing out where every secondary continuation of every given individual existence continues living, or exists. According to him, all what is in a person’s conscious state is a derivative of impression. The items in the external environment exist as discrete species, which are detachable from every secondary attribute in the conscious thought. For the purpose of negating every demonstration, or expression, of substance, he presents an analogy according to Boeree (1999). The analogy is that if one’s life is reduced to levels that are lower than that of an oyster’s life, he or she would be devoid of perception, including perception of hunger and thirst. Only the perception would continue existing.
The addition of more complicated perception would be incapable of yielding any idea of substance that can give rise to constant, as well as autonomous, self according to Hume (1789). The mind model developed by Hume (1789) merely documents data when the mind is distinctly conscious. Notably, the model isolates, as well as abstracts, the secondary attributes, or qualities, and objects devoid of metaphysics. The model does not define unity of experience according to Boeree (1999).
The notion that Kant (1787) holds of the self is elementarily a reaction to the model developed by Hume (1789). Kant (1787) comes off as keen on justifying his thinking that physics comprises of universal truths. He comes off as keen on insulating religion, particularly regarding beliefs in free will and immortality. In addition, he comes off as keen on correcting the earlier challenges, or problems, of a soul that is non-material and that is localized within space according to Boeree (1999). He employs inner sense in defending the body’s heterogeneity and the soul’s heterogeneity, projecting the body as an item of external sense and the soul as an item of internal sense. He holds that the self comprises of two elements: the outer-self along with the inner-self.
Kant (1787) employs the term empirical self-consciousness in describing the latter, the inner-self. Kant (1787) employs the term transcendental apperception to pass two messages. First, he uses term to mean a faculty that is of a synthetic nature. Second, he used the term to refer to the subject “I”. Logically, the function would happen in the inner sense. Kant (1787) holds that every representational state, including every outer object that is spatially localized, is in the sense. A person’s source of own representations belongs to the sense regardless of whether or not the source is a priori product or an external object as his or her mind’s modification according to Kant (1787). Kant (1787) views transcendental apperception as a pathway, or means, towards a person’s awareness, or consciousness, of own self. Even then, the sense does not denote pure apperception according to Boeree (1999).Rather, it is the consciousness, or awareness, of what one is experiencing as he or she is impacted on by thought.
Unlike Hume (1789), Kant (1787) holds that consciousness and unity of experience are critical to the self idea. Transcendental apperception brings together or unites every appearance into a single experience according to Kant (1787). That means that the unity is hinged on specific causal laws. There are syntheses, which are in line with given concepts, whose effect is the subordination of all to what Kant (1787) characterizes as transcendental unity. Kant (1787) holds that the consciousness’ contents can only be unified if they are defined by causal linkages. Kant (1787), unlike Hume (1789), opines that there are manifold representations that occasion the common understanding of the self as being a line shared subject. According to Kant (1787), the self concept necessitates a continuous undivided self. The concept is projected by Kant (1787) as an extension of universal unity, which spans numerous representations according to Boeree (1999).
By and large, the model developed by Kant responds to the inductive self model that Hume proposes. The model that Hume proposes is exclusively material-based. Hume projects the self as a passive spectator comparable to one who is watching own life go past him or her as on a television screen. Hume comes off as stringent determinist in his appreciation of the self: he contends that the self concept is merely memory along with imagination.