Aum Shinrikyo on the Transportation System in Japan – Terrorists Group Activity Analysis

Aum Shinrikyo on the Transportation System in Japan

Aum Shinrikyo attack on the Japan transportation system was considerably unique and different from other common terrorist attacks. Unlike others where bombing is the main form of attack, this particular attack which took place in 1995 used a deadly chemical known as Sarin in form of a liquid. The attack was carried out by five individuals who had a total of 11 plastic bags full of Sarin; a deadly nerve gas, which is considerably powerful and that had been previously declared by the United Nations as a weapon of mass destruction. The gas was released to the air causing temporal blindness to thousands of commuters, and managed to kill about 13 individuals. Although the attack was not very deadly in terms of damage caused, the specialists claimed that if the team had proper knowledge on the chemical use, or if the chemical was used properly, it could have caused dire results to the Japan population (Kyodo News, 2010).

Aum Shinrikyo on the Transportation System in Japan and how it relates to risk management perspectives of John Parachini on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

According to Parachini (2000), the federal government has established a number of ways to fight terrorism some which are considerably expensive. However, in Parachini (2000) views, the country stand minimal chances of experiencing the kind of terrorism being carried out in other foreign countries like Syria and Afghanistan. In Parachini (2000) views, the risk management and preparedness team focusing on fighting terrorism in the country should stop taking the worst case view and instead consider planning for attacks of low consequences with multiple chemicals use and trails of non-contagious biological agents. This implies that the country should consider defining the best strategies and preparedness to handle chemical and biological attacks. Moreover, (), claimed it is much easier to experience a chemical attack than other forms of terrorist attacks since some of the most lethal chemicals are legal and locally available. Thus it is much easier for a terrorist to plan for an attack using such weapons without being suspected.

A similar situation where legal and locally available chemical are used for terrorism was demonstrated in Aum Shinrikyo attack. Sarin is a legal chemical created in 1930s in Germany to be used in the development of pesticide. The chemical is highly toxic odorless and colorless. This means the chemical can be used to kill masses, especially since it is hardly detected. The chemical is said to cause nerve system disruption where it muscles and glands are overstimulated resulting shutting down of respiratory system. A single drop of Sarin is considerably dangerous, although a large amount is required to cause mass destruction, since it is non-persistent. This case is a perfect situation of what Parachini (2000) is referring to. The availability of Sarin for industrial used made it easy for terrorists to access it for massive destruction. Development of strategies to handle such threat would have prevented the attacks maybe by controlling their purchases through limited authorization.

Parachini (2000) also advocated for the use of local and/or state resources for fighting terrorism in any region. This according to Parachini (2000) would make any region more prepared to mitigate any risk of terrorism than depending on federal resources that are shared in and outside the country to meet the country’s interest of fighting terrorism. The federal government exposure ton acts of terrorism outside the country makes it to always plan for the worst-case in the country which is highly unlikely as terrorist understands that their mission can be highly unsuccessful due to the security measures implemented in the country. This simply means, the applied measures may fail to detect conventional attacks that focus on creating small impacts without fail. Only proper local and state terrorism mitigation plans can thus address such acts which targets mass destructions in tens and not thousands, but which can be very lethal if not managed with time. This is similar to what was experienced in Japan where the attack was only realized after taking place, with no suspension and without proper measures to address such situations. Consequently, the two workers who decided to get rid of the chemicals died due to poor handling of the chemical. Local mitigation which includes education on how to identify the chemicals used, how to neutralize its effect, or to avoid its effect could have been of great use to the transportation subway workers and all passengers using the subway. This raining can only be done locally.

Parachini (2000) also advocates for reduced publicity on the country’s vulnerability to terrorism.According Parachini constant public discussion and analyzing the progress of terrorism investigation and attacks makes the country shift it concentration to the real attacks. In addition, this publicity somehow acts as an advertisement of the country vulnerability to various terrorist attacks in the country. Parachini (2000) thus advocate for acting silently and developing unknown mitigation where terrorists lack information about the country’s strategies to fight terrorism and thus, lack the chances to lay their plan since they do not know of the barriers they can meet.  In Parachini (2000) a comprehensive terrorism risk assessment should be done with conventional attacks in mind and workable mitigation process created to minimize chances of any terrorist attack and ensuring that resources are effectively used to fight terrorism. With such plans, Japanese government could have managed to handle the attack and safe the life of the victims.


ORDER UNIQUE ANSWER NOW